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DIFFERENTIAL EFFECTS OF INCENTIVE MOTIVATORS 
ON WORK PERFORMANCE 
ALEXANDER D. STAJKOVIC 
University of Wisconsin-Madison 
FRED LUTHANS 
University of Nebraska 
In this field experiment, we first compared the performance effects of money system- 
atically administered through the organizational behavior modification (O.B. Mod.) 
model and routine pay for performance and then compared the effects of O.B. Mod.- 
administered money, social recognition, and performance feedback. The money inter- 
vention based on the O.B. Mod. outperformed routine pay for performance (perfor- 
mance increase = 37% vs. 11%) and also had stronger effects on performance than 
social recognition (24%) and performance feedback (20%). 
Although behavioral management, as a system- 
atic approach to increasing employee effectiveness, 
was formulated about 25 years ago (e.g., Luthans & 
Kreitner, 1975), organizations are generally not 
using contingent incentive motivators to manage 
workers' day-to-day task-related behaviors and to 
improve productivity (Davis-Blake & Pfeffer, 1989; 
Ilgen, Major, & Tower, 1994). Moreover, the use of 
various incentives to enhance work performance is 
mostly ignored or, at best, assumed to be handled 
with existing pay, benefits, or year-end profit shar- 
ing or bonus plans (Kerr, 1999; Stajkovic & Luthans, 
1997). 
Among the models proposed within the concep- 
tual framework of behavioral management (e.g., 
Scott & Podsakoff, 1985), the organizational behav- 
ior modification (O.B. Mod.) model (Luthans & 
Kreitner, 1985) has been frequently used to foster 
the effectiveness of various incentive motivators in 
different types of organizations (Stajkovic & 
Luthans, 1997). Based on the principles of behavior 
modification (Bandura, 1969), the O.B. Mod. model 
provides a five-step framework for identifying, 
measuring, analyzing, contingently intervening in, 
and evaluating employees' task behaviors aimed at 
performance improvement. In a recent meta-analy- 
sis (Stajkovic & Luthans, 1997), we examined the 
empirical findings over the past 20 years that per- 
tain to the effectiveness of various interventions 
when applied through the O.B. Mod. model and 
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found a 17 percent average increase in perfor- 
mance. 
On the basis of distinct characteristics, such as 
outcome utility, informative content, and the 
mechanisms through which they operate to control 
human action (Bandura, 1986, 1997), the perfor- 
mance-enhancing incentive motivators most fre- 
quently used in organizations can be classified as: 
(1) money, (2) social recognition, and (3) perfor- 
mance feedback (Stajkovic & Luthans, 1997). Al- 
though the direct performance impact of each of 
these incentive motivators has been documented 
(Kluger & DeNisi, 1996; Komaki, Coombs, & Schep- 
man, 1996), researchers have yet to examine the 
differences in the effects of the various incentive 
motivators on performance when they are analyzed 
concurrently in the same field setting and when 
systematic application procedures are taken into 
account. 
The purpose of this study was to examine two 
research questions: (1) What effect does money (the 
most common incentive motivator) have on perfor- 
mance when it is routinely administered as pay for 
performance versus systematically applied through 
the theory-based steps of the O.B. Mod. model? and 
(2) What are the relative performance effects of 
money, social recognition, and feedback, when all 
three are commonly implemented through the O.B. 
Mod. model? Our goal in addressing the first ques- 
tion was to explain why traditionally administered 
pay for performance does not always seem to work 
and to examine if stronger effects might be realized 
through-systematic application, as is offered by the 
steps of the O.B. Mod. model. Our intention in 
examining the second research question was not 
only to show that the same behavior can be regu- 
lated by different incentive motivators, but also 
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that different incentive motivators may regulate the 
same behavior differently (Bandura, 1986). This 
premise is based on social cognitive theory, accord- 
ing to which "human behavior... cannot be fully 
understood without considering the regulatory in- 
fluence of response consequences" (Bandura, 1986: 
228) and, more specifically, that human action is 
better predicted by the content than by the sheer 
amount of an incentive motivator (Bandura, 1997). 
THEORY AND APPLICATION OF MONEY 
We base our study on two basic conceptual pre- 
mises. First, we argue that the controversy sur- 
rounding pay for performance (Gupta & Shaw, 
1998; Kerr, 1999; Lawler, 1990; Luthans & Stajk- 
ovic, 1999; Pfeffer, 1995) largely reflects an imple- 
mentation issue and not a question of the incentive 
value of money per se. Second, once implementa- 
tion is held constant through the O.B. Mod. model, 
we suggest that commonly used incentive motiva- 
tors theoretically have different natures and, thus, 
different impacts on performance. Given that much 
of human agency is rooted in social systems (Ban- 
dura, 1999), the relevant literature (Bandura, 1986) 
suggests that different incentive motivators may 
have different performance effects because of their 
subsequent outcome utility, informative content, 
and the mechanisms through which they operate to 
control human action. 
The Theoretical Basis of Money as an 
Incentive Motivator 
The theoretical underpinnings of money are be- 
ginning to receive attention (Mitchell & Mickel, 
1999). We suggest that the nature of money as a 
construct and as an incentive motivator can be 
explained through the social cognitive theoretical 
dimensions. 
Outcome utility. Although monetary incentives 
can take several forms (for instance, tangible prizes, 
paid vacations), in organizations cash payments are 
the most prevalent generalized monetary incentive 
(Rynes & Gerhart, 1999). The main characteristic of 
all monetary incentives (regardless of their form) is 
that they cost organizations financial resources. 
Whereas prizes, and so forth, derive their motivat- 
ing potential from their actual content, the outcome 
utility of money is derived from the fact that it 
ultimately leads to some form of tangible payoff 
(Bandura, 1986). Thus, the incentive value of 
money is based on its exchange function, for it can 
be exchanged for most goods, services, and privi- 
leges (Bandura, 1986; Stajkovic & Luthans, 1997). 
As a result, people are attracted to well-paying jobs, 
extend extra effort to perform the activities that 
bring them more pay, and become agitated if their 
pay is threatened or decreased. 
Informative content. The informative value of 
money largely depends on whether it is provided 
on a fixed (set-amount paycheck) or on a variable 
(commission based on sales) schedule. In the 
former case, the information conveyed is merely 
dichotomous, with its receipt indicating some per- 
formance success ("My performance must have 
been satisfactory since I received the check") and 
vice versa. In the latter case, where different 
amounts received indicate different levels of per- 
formance, the informative value of money increases 
to an ordinal level, since it more specifically indi- 
cates the magnitude of a potential performance- 
standard discrepancy. However, in neither case 
does money convey much task-related information 
concerning performance effort, information cues 
needed, and the content of behaviors. 
Regulatory mechanism. In regulating human ac- 
tion, money can have instrumental or symbolic mo- 
tivational properties. If perceived in its instrumen- 
tal form, money motivates because it can provide 
outcomes that satisfy physiological or psychologi- 
cal needs. However perceived symbolically, money 
generates social comparison information, which 
can indicate a person's standing regarding psycho- 
logical aspirations for valued and desired aspects of 
social life (such as status). Logically, there may be 
dynamic sequencing in the regulatory emphasis on 
either instrumental or symbolic perceptions. It ap- 
pears reasonable to induce that symbolic compari- 
sons (perceptions of relative standing) are likely to 
dominate an individual's regulatory cognitive pro- 
cess if physiological or psychological needs are 
perceived to have been reasonably met for the 
present and the future, as would be the case for a 
person with high income and/or savings. 
Pay-for-Performance Applications 
In addition to explaining money's conceptual na- 
ture, a theory about money as an incentive motiva- 
tor needs to also demonstrate how to best imple- 
ment it for performance improvement. One of the 
most common ways in which money has been ad- 
ministered to improve productivity in organiza- 
tions has been through pay-for-performance plans 
(Durham & Bartol, 2000). Pay for performance has 
been defined as "paying individuals predetermined 
amounts of money for each unit produced" 
(Lawler, 1990: 57). Despite the frequent use of pay 
for performance as an incentive motivator because 
of the presumed value of money to employees, 
many lingering doubts remain regarding the effec- 
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tiveness of this approach (Kerr, 1999; Lawler, 1990; 
Pfeffer, 1998). In particular, with but a few excep- 
tions (e.g., Hanlon, Meyer, & Taylor, 1994), most of 
the evidence regarding the effectiveness of pay for 
performance is based on anecdotal testimonials 
and one-time company cases, rather than on meth- 
odologically more rigorous empirical studies. This 
has resulted in mixed and even confusing evidence 
on how, where, and even whether to use pay for 
performance to improve performance (Gupta & 
Shaw, 1998; Lawler, 1990; Pfeffer, 1998). 
The major reason for weak or mixed effects of pay 
for performance appears to be in the administra- 
tion/implementation procedures (Kerr, 1999; Lawler, 
1990; Pfeffer, 1995). Specifically, although Pfeffer 
noted that "one of the oldest and most reliable 
findings in psychology is the principle of reinforce- 
ment" (1995: 60), he also stated that the "instability 
in reward practices is not related to instability in 
underlying principles of human behavior; more 
likely, it is caused by... incomplete knowledge of 
basic social science... [and] what we know about 
behavior" (1995: 60). Similarly, after an extensive 
review of the literature, Lawler (1990) also con- 
cluded that process and design problems limit the 
effectiveness of pay for performance. He stated, 
"What is needed is a set of fundamentally different 
approaches to conceptualizing and structuring pay 
systems because the traditional practices do not 
score well when evaluated against the kind of re- 
sults that a pay system should produce" (Lawler, 
1990: 5). In short, although pay for performance is 
meant to improve employee behavior, it is often 
aimed at "the wrong behavior" (Lawler, 1990: 58; 
cf. Kerr, 1999). 
To address these application problems, we pro- 
pose the use of the O.B. Mod. model to enhance the 
effectiveness of pay for performance (for model 
details, see Luthans and Stajkovic [1999]). We 
propose use of the model because it provides 
theory-based, yet application-oriented, specific an- 
alytic procedures for the application of key behav- 
ioral principles, such as identifying and measuring 
critical performance behaviors, functionally ana- 
lyzing antecedents and consequences, intervening 
with contingent incentive motivators, and evaluat- 
ing performance outcomes. In particular, the appli- 
cation of pay for performance may be greatly 
enhanced if task performers have a clear under- 
standing of exactly what behaviors are critically 
related to performance and how they will be objec- 
tively measured (steps 1 and 2 in the model). Next, 
functional analysis (step 3) is needed to determine 
what stimulates the occurrence of the critical 
performance-related behavior (training) and what 
may be impeding it (inadequate or outdated tech- 
nology). The key, action step (step 4) in the model 
specifies how to administer the incentive motivator 
(money, in this case) so it is contingent upon the 
employee doing the identified and measured criti- 
cal performance-related behaviors. This step also 
includes considering the appropriate size of the 
reinforcement (for example, the amount of money). 
Finally, step 5 of the model is evaluation, which 
insures that the money is indeed leading to signif- 
icant performance improvement. In other words, 
the O.B. Mod. model provides design procedures 
by which every (according to Wood's [1986] theory 
of tasks) critical constituent of a task, such as com- 
ponent identification (identifying behavioral acts), 
coordination (sequencing behavioral acts), and dy- 
namic activity (functional analysis of temporal 
changes), is taken into account. In view of the 
above theory and design procedures, we hypothe- 
size that: 
Hypothesis 1. Money, systematically adminis- 
tered using the O.B. Mod. model, will have a 
greater impact on employee performance than 
will pay for performance routinely adminis- 
tered with no systematic application steps. 
NONFINANCIAL INCENTIVE MOTIVATORS 
We next address the performance impact of 
money as compared to the impact of nonfinancial 
incentive motivators. Social cognitive theory is 
again used to analyze the nature of social recogni- 
tion and performance feedback and to derive a hy- 
pothesis on the differential effects. 
Social Recognition 
Outcome utility. Social recognition consists of 
personal attention, mostly conveyed verbally, 
through expressions of interest, approval, and ap- 
preciation for a job well done (Luthans & Stajkovic, 
2000). Although social recognition does not have 
direct financial costs, it does use managers' time, 
effort, and interpersonal skills. Social recognition 
derives its outcome utility from its predictive value 
and not from the social reactions themselves (Ban- 
dura, 1986). Since desired personal outcomes (pro- 
motions, raises) are usually preceded by social ap- 
proval, by reversing the correlates, the positive 
reactions of relevant others become predictors of 
desired (mostly material) rewards, and thus be- 
come incentives for future action. As a result, peo- 
ple will engage in behaviors that receive social 
recognition and avoid behaviors that lead to the 
disapproval of others (Bandura, 1986; Luthans & 
Stajkovic, 2000). 
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Informative content. Like money, social recog- 
nition does not entail much task-related informa- 
tion that may be useful for subsequent performance 
improvement. However, whereas the informative 
value of money resides in its amount, the informa- 
tive value of social recognition resides in the con- 
tent of what has been delivered and not in its quan- 
tity. Showing employees how much their work is 
valued through social recognition is not achieved 
by frequent noncontingent phrases (such as "Good 
job!"), but by expression of genuine personal ap- 
preciation for the successful performance. This is 
because indiscriminate approval that does not 
eventually result in desired benefits becomes an 
empty reward, and thus lacks motivating potential. 
The indiscriminate approval and genuine recogni- 
tion with promising outcomes represent the contin- 
uum from the dichotomous to the ordinal informa- 
tive level of social recognition. 
Regulatory mechanism. The motivational power 
of social recognition is cognitively "operational- 
ized" through the basic human capability of fore- 
thought (Bandura, 1986). On the basis of the social 
recognition received and, thus, the perception of 
desired consequences to come, employees will self- 
regulate their future behaviors by forethought. 
They may plan courses of action for the future, 
anticipate the likely consequences of their future 
actions, and set performance goals for themselves. 
Thus, the future acquires causal properties by being 
represented cognitively by forethought exercised in 
the present (Bandura, 1986, 1997; Stajkovic & Luthans, 
1998b). In other words, the forethought is the self- 
regulatory mechanism that allows perceived 
future outcomes (based on social recognition) to 
be cognitively transferred into current action. 
Performance Feedback 
Outcome utility. Although performance feed- 
back can be conveyed in a variety of different forms 
and ways, it usually refers to information regarding 
a level of performance and/or the manner and effi- 
ciency in which performance processes have been 
executed (Kluger & DeNisi, 1996). In terms of its 
ability to influence employee behavior, feedback 
derives its motivating power almost exclusively 
from the information it provides about an employ- 
ee's performance, which, in turn, enhances role 
clarity about a task to be performed (Bandura, 1986; 
Kluger & DeNisi, 1996). However, in order to foster 
role clarity, performance feedback needs to be: (1) 
clearly delivered as an external intervention, (2) 
conveyed in a positive manner, (3) immediate, and 
(4) specific (Stajkovic & Luthans, 1997). 
Informative content. Even though feedback gen- 
erally conveys more task information to employees 
than either money or social recognition, the level of 
information still varies depending on whether out- 
come or process feedback has been delivered. Out- 
come feedback refers mostly to conveying to em- 
ployees discrepancies between their current level 
of performance and the desired performance stan- 
dard. In addition to this information, process feed- 
back includes communicating to the employees 
how the performance was executed (the critical 
behavioral components for the task), and, impor- 
tantly, what could be done in the future to improve 
the performance (a potentially better sequencing of 
behavioral acts, the potential dynamic complexi- 
ties where sequencing may need to change, and so 
forth). 
Regulatory mechanism. Feedback regulates be- 
havior through the basic human capability of self- 
reflection, where the potential feedback-standard 
discrepancy is first cognitively evaluated and then 
acted upon (Bandura, 1986). After personal stan- 
dards have been set, incongruity between a behav- 
ior and the standard activates self-evaluative reac- 
tions, which, in turn, influence subsequent action. 
In other words, the self-reflective capability can be 
defined as self-reflective consciousness, which en- 
ables people to think and analyze their experiences 
and thought processes. By reflecting on their expe- 
riences, people can generate specific knowledge 
about their environments and about themselves. 
Thus, performance feedback regulates action by 
initiating evaluation through self-reflection of and 
stimulating a reaction to the feedback-standard dis- 
crepancy. 
Differential Engagement of Incentive Motivators 
The theoretical discussion so far implies the dif- 
ferent natures of money, social recognition, and 
feedback and, as a result, their potentially different 
effects on performance. In suggesting that effects 
differ, we also assume the importance of task and 
domain specificity (Bandura, 1986). Such specific- 
ity is important because social cognitive theory is 
based on the major premise that people act 
uniquely and selectively in different domains and 
under different situational demands (Bandura, 
1986, 1997; Locke, 1997). Specifically, every action 
is unique within a certain domain and does not 
necessarily generalize to a variety of other domains, 
nor do actions ever (unless in a vacuum) represent 
decontextualized behaviors (Locke, 1997). Thus, as 
also postulated in other research areas (self-efficacy, 
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goal setting), we suggest that money, social recog- 
nition, and feedback represent context- and person- 
specific motivators that do not have exclusive re- 
inforcing properties independent of the domain in 
which they are implemented. Importantly, this 
does not mean that the motivating powers of 
money, social recognition, and feedback do not 
generalize to different domains, but rather, that 
they generalize differently for different employees, 
tasks, and contexts. 
Applying these arguments to the present study 
generates further suggestions as to the between- 
group ordering of the magnitudes of the effects of 
money, social recognition, and feedback. As the 
following Methods section will outline in detail, 
we selected a manufacturing organization for this 
study because this type of setting is the most feasi- 
ble for conducting a quasi experiment. The com- 
pany selected offered multiple relatively equiva- 
lent groups and used objective performance 
measures that allowed for less reliance on supervi- 
sors' subjective judgments of performance effec- 
tiveness. Thus, for our study's participants and or- 
ganizational context, we suggest that money would 
have the strongest effect on performance, followed 
by social recognition, and then feedback. 
In this setting, employees would probably per- 
ceive money as having a high instrumental value 
and as worth extra effort, given the relatively low 
wage rate. Social recognition, although not result- 
ing in instant rewards, as did money, could be 
perceived as indicating potential upcoming re- 
wards, such as a pay raise or transfer to a better job 
or to a more desired shift, rewards that would mo- 
tivate further pursuit of behaviors that received 
contingent social recognition. Finally, feedback 
would have the weakest effect on performance for 
two reasons. First, in contrast to social recognition, 
which, in addition to its predictive powers, also 
involves a form of feedback (albeit a nominal one), 
performance feedback does not include any form of 
explicit social recognition, and clearly does not 
involve money. Second, given its informational na- 
ture, when feedback is provided for routine behav- 
iors, that information, although beneficial, may not 
be as useful to self-regulation, given the narrow 
demands of the simple task studied here. Thus, we 
hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 2. When all three incentive motiva- 
tors are applied in the same way through the 
O.B. Mod. model, money produces the stron- 
gest effect on performance, followed by social 
recognition, and then by performance feed- 
back. 
METHODS 
Study Site 
The study took place in the operations division 
of a large company with over 7,000 employees in 
one metropolitan area. To separate the monetary 
from the other two interventions, we used two sep- 
arate facilities, performing identical work, located 
several miles apart. The operations division is re- 
sponsible for processing and mailing credit card 
bills for the organization's several hundred finan- 
cial institution, retail, and "e-commerce" custom- 
ers. This organization has been an industry leader 
in objectively measuring performance. For this 
study, we collected individual performance data, 
recorded in real time by a meter at each employee's 
workstation during both a baseline preintervention 
and a postintervention month. 
Intervention Groups and Study Participants 
Work in this division was performed in shifts at 
the two facilities, which permitted the formation of 
four intact groups (N = 182). The four groups 
(shifts) used in this study were: (1) routine pay for 
performance (n = 50), (2) monetary incentives 
(n = 43), (3) social recognition (n = 50), and (4) 
performance feedback (n = 39). These groups were 
comparable in terms of the workers who: (1) were 
employed full-time in both the baseline and inter- 
vention months, (2) performed exactly the same 
task, and (3) had, on the average, approximately the 
same training, work experience, education (no col- 
lege), demographic characteristics (average age was 
26-38 years, gender was about evenly split, and 
ethnicity was about 25 percent minorities), and 
supervision (across the groups, supervisors' age, 
tenure, gender, and supervisory experience in gen- 
eral and in the current unit were similar). 
Procedures 
Pertaining to our first hypothesis, the routine- 
pay-for-performance group simply received sup- 
plemental pay for increased performance. This 
shift's supervisors, who did not receive any behav- 
ioral management training, informed workers of 
this intervention. In contrast, pertaining to our sec- 
ond hypothesis, the other three groups operated 
under Luthans and Kreitner's (1985) five-step O.B. 
Mod. model of behavioral management. The inter- 
vention procedures used replicated those used in 
previous research (Luthans, Paul, & Baker, 1981; 
Welsh, Luthans, & Sommer, 1993). Each groups' 
managers and supervisors had an identical three- 
hour O.B. Mod. training session conducted by the 
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same researcher. The training received was identi- 
cal, except as pertained to the type of intervention 
(step 4) they were to use. 
After being given a brief background on behav- 
ioral management, the supervisors were asked to 
identify critical, observable, and measurable behav- 
iors that were currently deficient but had a high 
potential for improving worker performance. The 
supervisors were then trained in identifying the 
antecedents and consequences of the identified 
performance behaviors, knowledge of which they 
then used as background for implementing their 
specific intervention manipulation. The interven- 
tion stage represents the action step in O.B. Mod. 
and was the treatment manipulation in this study. 
Each group was separately trained in and imple- 
mented a different reward intervention to manage 
the critical performance behaviors previously iden- 
tified. For the pay-for-performance and monetary 
incentive groups, the researchers, in conjunction 
with management, developed the supplemental 
pay plan. 
Importantly, the supervisors in both the pay-for- 
performance and monetary incentive groups care- 
fully communicated at the beginning of the inter- 
vention month the specifics of the plan to ensure 
that the workers fully understood the payout. This 
was all that was done in the pay-for-performance 
group. The trained supervisors in the O.B. Mod.- 
administered money group: also (1) discussed with 
workers whether they viewed the payout for in- 
creased performance as meaningful and worth the 
effort, (2) provided workers with ongoing help and 
coaching about specifics of the program, and, most 
importantly, (3) continuously throughout the inter- 
vention period reminded individual workers that 
the monetary contingency consequence would be 
forthcoming when the workers were engaged in the 
critical performance behaviors. 
In the social recognition intervention group, the 
trained supervisors administered personal recogni- 
tion and attention contingent upon observing work- 
ers performing the specific behaviors identified in 
step 1. Supervisors were explicitly instructed that 
the social recognition and attention was not to be 
sugary praise or a pat on the back. Rather, the 
intention was to let the worker know that the su- 
pervisor knew that he or she was performing be- 
haviors previously communicated as important to 
performance. For example, the supervisor said 
things such as, "When I was walking through your 
area on my way to the front office this morning, I 
saw you making a sequence check, that's what 
we're really concentrating on." Finally, in the feed- 
back intervention group, the supervisors developed 
charts and other written and verbal objective (usu- 
ally quantitative) information concerning the fre- 
quency of the identified critical performance be- 
haviors. For example, unlike supervisors in the 
social recognition group, supervisors in the feed- 
back group would chart the number-of sequence 
checks made and communicate that to the workers 
with no added personal comments. 
Threats to Internal Validity 
Since this study cannot be classified as a fully 
randomized experiment but rather, as a quasi ex- 
periment, in which there was randomization of 
groups to treatment but not of individuals to groups 
(Cook & Campbell, 1979), we needed to analyze the 
potential threats to internal validity. In particular, 
selection artifacts appeared implausible, since the 
baseline performance levels were not statistically 
different. In this case, according to Cook and Camp- 
bell (1979), initial performance levels could be as- 
sumed to be equal. This assumption is especially 
valid when analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) is 
also used to control for the initial performance as a 
covariate. Ambiguity about the direction of causal 
effects was ruled out, since we only used external 
interventions as treatments. The presence of the 
same general environment and the occurrence of no 
noteworthy events for all four groups prevented 
any biasing impact of history effects. We controlled 
for a local history effect by: (1) holding O.B. Mod. 
procedures constant across the three groups, (2) 
having the same researcher train all supervisors, 
and (3) conducting the study for all groups in the 
same, technically determined manufacturing lay- 
out. In addition, bias due to instrumentation differ- 
ences can be ruled out since the same objective 
performance measures derived from workstation 
meters were used for each group. Nor could testing 
be a source of bias, since questionnaires were not 
used. We also designed our study to include only 
participants that were present during both baseline 
and intervention periods, thus effectively prevent- 
ing the mortality effect. Regarding maturation, all 
participants in our study had relatively similar ex- 
perience and were engaged in a relatively short, 
one-month intervention period that does not ap- 
pear long enough for any meaningful personality or 
knowledge changes to occur. Thus, all of the above 
threats to internal validity were either ruled out or 
minimized by the study design. 
Among the threats to internal validity that our 
design may not have deflected are resentful demor- 
alization and compensatory rivalry. These would 
also appear to have been minimized, since the two 
groups that received money: (1) were in a different 
facility several miles away from that of the two 
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groups that received no money and (2) had neither 
knowledge about, communication with, nor any 
interaction with the other two groups, as reported 
by the management and the workers themselves. 
Most importantly, in the two money-receiving 
groups, the observed effects on work performance 
were significantly different (see below). Related to 
these arguments, diffusion of treatment appears im- 
plausible given: (1) the different locations, (2) the 
random presence of an on-site researcher, who ver- 
ified that supervisors knew what they were to do 
and that they clearly and continuously imple- 
mented the specifics of their assigned intervention, 
and (3) the significantly different effect magnitudes 
the interventions yielded. Safeguarding against 
these latter threats ensured that the treatment 
groups were not mutually equalized. 
RESULTS 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics and complete 
results pertaining to both hypotheses. 
Monetary Incentives with and without 
Systematic Application 
Routine pay for performance increased perfor- 
mance over its baseline level 11 percent (t = 2.01, 
p < .05), whereas money applied through the 
systematic procedures of the O.B. Mod. model 
increased performance 31.7 percent (t = 4.35, p < 
.05). The between-group comparison between 
money as routine pay for performance and the same 
amount of money systematically provided through 
the O.B. Mod. model revealed a significant differ- 
ence in performance improvement (t = 1.80, p < 
.05), with the O.B. group outperforming the routine 
group by slightly over 20 percent. This finding 
supported Hypothesis 1, clearly confirming the im- 
portance of systematic procedures when monetary 
incentives are applied. 
Monetary versus Nonfinancial Incentives 
Since, for all three types of incentive motivators, 
performance significantly increased from the base- 
line to the intervention month, we next examined 
between-group differences in the effect magnitudes 
of O.B. Mod.-administered money, social recogni- 
tion, and feedback. 
We conducted analysis of variance of posttreat- 
ment performance levels and found significant ef- 
fect differences among the three incentive motiva- 
tors (F = 4.28, p < .01). In particular, money had 
the strongest effect on performance, followed by 
social recognition and feedback. Analytical com- 
parisons, using Tukey's post hoc test, revealed that 
the differences in effects on performance were sig- 
nificant both for money and social reinforcement 
and for money and feedback. Although in the hy- 
pothesized direction, the magnitude of the differ- 
ence in the effects of social recognition and feed- 
back did not reach statistical significance. These 
findings largely supported Hypothesis 2. 
Table 1 shows that the baseline performance lev- 
els of the groups under these three interventions 
may have some nominal variations. Thus, we con- 
ducted an analysis of covariance, a procedure that 
can account for the initial level of potential perfor- 
mance differences. Using baseline performance 
level as a covariate, we first adjusted the estimates 
by using the equation for one covariate (Pedhazur, 
1982) and then examined the differences among the 
performance levels after the treatment. As expected 
in ANCOVA (Cook & Campbell, 1979; Pedhazur, 
1982), standard deviations and standard errors de- 
creased owing to the decrease in mean square re- 
siduals. As a result, the precision of analysis in- 
TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics for all Interventionsa 
Baseline Performance after Adjusted 
Performance Intervention Valuesa After-Intervention 
O.B. Mean minus Performance 
Intervention n Mod. Mean s.d. Mean s.d. s.e. s.d. s.e. Baseline Mean Improvement b t 
Money 50 No 163,157 64,622 181,272 52,602 9,018 18,115 11 2.01* 
Money 43 Yes 132,147 50,713 174,056 61,449 9,371 58,614 8,939 41,908 31.7 4.35* 
Social 50 Yes 106,911 55,519 132,635 91,262 12,906 75,861 10,728 25,724 24 2.42* 
Feedback 39 Yes 107,916 68,036 129,195 79,898 12,794 62,517 10,011 21,279 20 2.04* 
a Adjusted for the covariate, baseline performance (F = 52.21, p < .01), after an ANCOVA for the three O.B. Mod. interventions (F = 
21.39, p < .01). b Percent change. 
Main-effect impact on performance. 
* p < .05 
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creased, with the results for the postintervention 
between-group performance differences (F = 6.02, 
p < .01) and post hoc comparisons remaining the 
same. These findings (7 = .29, q2 = .09; Hays, 
1988), adjusted for the performance baseline co- 
variate (F = 52.21, p < .01) after ANCOVA for the 
three O.B. Mod. interventions (F = 21.39, p < .01), 
at least statistically alleviate the concern that per- 
formance differences may have been due to selec- 
tion artifacts in different treatment groups. 
DISCUSSION 
By providing the theoretical rationale and empir- 
ically examining differences in the effects of rou- 
tine pay for performance and systematically admin- 
istered (O.B. Mod.) money, social recognition, and 
feedback, we hope to have initiated a change from 
focusing on the general question of whether con- 
tingent incentives are related to performance to 
examining more specific questions regarding the 
nature, relative impacts, and mechanisms underly- 
ing the relationship between incentive motivators 
and performance. These lines of research may fur- 
ther explain the contribution of incentive motivators 
to work performance by guiding the effort to develop 
process-oriented analysis of the contextual and cog- 
nitive differentiating factors that we proposed. 
In this manufacturing setting, characterized by 
well-defined, simple jobs and relatively low wages, 
money was likely perceived as having a high in- 
strumental value that was worth extra effort. Extra 
effort, in turn, translated into increased perfor- 
mance, since there was no real need for increases in 
knowledge, skill acquisition, strategy development, 
and self-efficacy. However, the finding of a signif- 
icant difference between the effects on performance 
of routine pay for performance and the O.B. Mod.- 
administered money clearly points to the impor- 
tance of theory-based, systematic application pro- 
cedures (Lawler, 1990; Pfeffer, 1995). 
Regarding social recognition, the more workers 
received it, the more likely they were to foresee it as 
suggestive of some forthcoming desired tangible 
outcome. Thus, although not resulting in an instant 
material benefit, social recognition was likely per- 
ceived as a latent variable potentially indicating, in 
this setting, a pay raise, a transfer to a better job, or 
a transfer to a more desired shift. Cognitively bring- 
ing the anticipated future into the present by fore- 
thought in turn motivated workers to further pur- 
sue behaviors that received such social support 
(Luthans & Stajkovic, 2000). However, although the 
social environment has been conceptually recog- 
nized as playing an important role in human be- 
havior, the use of social recognition as a specific 
intervention to improve work performance has 
been seriously neglected, if not totally ignored. Our 
results show that it can greatly improve perfor- 
mance and, unlike money, generate no direct finan- 
cial costs. 
Finally, feedback provided for simple and well- 
defined tasks may not be as useful to self-regulation 
and subsequent motivation as it may be for tasks 
with more role ambiguity. In addition, treatment 
manipulation of feedback has always been a com- 
plex undertaking, likely contributing to the mixed 
findings on feedback effects obtained over the years 
(Kluger & DeNisi, 1996). For example, whereas so- 
cial recognition by its nature involves some form of 
feedback (an act of recognition itself), objective 
(quantitative) performance feedback does not in- 
clude any form of explicit social recognition and is 
usually given when workers do not perform critical 
behaviors. Yet, in both cases, information is com- 
municated in a positive manner. These similarities 
in social recognition and feedback may explain the 
closeness in their effects on performance in this 
study. 
Future Theory Development 
The important question for future theory devel- 
opment concerns the contextual conditions that 
would further explain the differences in the effec- 
tiveness of the three incentive motivators under 
different circumstances. We suggest that a key vari- 
able in this process may be task complexity. In fact, 
given that tasks are an inherent part of any study of 
work performance, task complexity has been ana- 
lyzed as a moderator in a number of areas in organ- 
izational behavior, such as self-efficacy (Stajkovic 
& Luthans, 1998a), goal setting (Wood, Mento, & 
Locke, 1987), and job design (Hackman & Oldham, 
1980). The importance of task complexity is de- 
rived from the fact that different levels of task com- 
plexity have different implications for the behav- 
ioral, information-processing, and cognitive facilities 
of the task performer. In particular, in comparison 
to low task complexity, high task complexity places 
greater demands on individuals' (1) required 
knowledge, (2) skill capacity, (3) behavioral facil- 
ity, (4) information processing, (5) persistence, and 
(6) self-efficacy (Bandura, 1986, 1997; Stajkovic & 
Luthans, 1998a; Wood, 1986). 
Since, given these factors, complex tasks do not 
lend themselves to easy appraisal or to easy execu- 
tion, we suggest that the effect ordering of incentive 
motivators for complex tasks found in professional 
and managerial work settings would be different 
from the ordering we found. In particular, we sug- 
gest that for complex tasks, feedback would have 
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the strongest effects on work performance, fol- 
lowed by social recognition and then money. 
Given its emphasis on informative content, feed- 
back would appear to best provide the varied 
information needed for the successful execution of 
complex tasks, which are usually multifaceted. 
Complex tasks also tend to be ambiguously defined 
and may lack objective performance measures. As a 
result, task performers may not fully understand 
what they have to do and what means to use and 
thus will lack accurate information conducive to 
successful performance. Under these conditions, 
the importance of clarifying role ambiguity as an 
outcome utility of feedback appears critical for suc- 
cessful performance. 
Social recognition derives its importance for the 
performance of complex tasks from its effects on 
self-efficacy (Bandura, 1997), which is, in turn, the 
major predictor of work-related performance on 
complex tasks (Stajkovic & Luthans, 1998a). In this 
case, social recognition is framed as verbal persua- 
sion focused on enhancing task performers' beliefs 
about what they can do with what they already 
have (as opposed to persuasion focused on enhanc- 
ing skill and ability, as would feedback) (Bandura, 
1997; Stajkovic & Luthans, 1998b). Expressing faith 
in employees' ability to perform through social rec- 
ognition is especially important when they face 
novel tasks and when they have performance diffi- 
culties and, as a result, may be questioning their 
personal efficacy. 
High-complexity performance usually requires a 
high educational level, which is typically associ- 
ated with professional and managerial jobs, and, by 
implication, high pay. It follows that money may 
have less motivating potential if high pay is already 
present, especially if it is perceived in its instru- 
mental form. However, at higher levels of pay, 
money is likely to take on symbolic properties and 
may become an instrument of social comparison. 
Regardless of the way it is perceived, money usu- 
ally produces increased effort, which, on its own, 
does not seem sufficient for the successful perfor- 
mance of a complex professional or managerial 
task. High self-efficacy, congruent skills, task strat- 
egies, and a higher level of goals are also needed 
(Stajkovic & Luthans, 1998a). In comparison to 
money, these factors are more readily provided in- 
directly by social recognition through its impact on 
self-efficacy and, most of the time, directly by feed- 
back. 
Future Research 
Since the above theoretical suggestions have 
been missing from the literature on incentive mo- 
tivators, we suggest several interesting avenues for 
future research. First, researchers could examine 
the moderating impact of task complexity on the 
relationship between incentive motivators and per- 
formance by varying the level of the complexity of 
the task in each studied intervention and then test- 
ing the within-group effects and between-group dif- 
ferences. Next, to provide even greater insight, the 
interventions could be examined in different com- 
binations for different complexity levels. Finally, 
the magnitude of each intervention could also be 
specified on an ordinal level. Such research would 
provide answers as to which incentive motivator or 
combination, for which magnitude, produces the 
greatest effect on performance for different levels of 
task complexity. 
Another, related, line of research might focus on 
whether incentive motivators only entice workers 
to mobilize greater effort or also lead to the devel- 
opment of more effective task strategies through 
increased self-efficacy. Such development might 
occur because different incentive motivators may 
produce different effects, through improved perfor- 
mance, on self-efficacy. As Bandura (1997) put it, it 
is not behavior that causes behavior, but what is 
psychologically made out of it (see Stajkovic & 
Summer, 2000). Finally, the level of task complex- 
ity may also determine if new task-related skills are 
needed to successfully execute the intricate de- 
mands of complex tasks, or if enhancing self-effi- 
cacy with the same skill level would account for 
the same variance. 
Practical Implications 
Providing empirically derived positive results by 
using the best features of both the power of indi- 
vidual incentive motivators and O.B. Mod. proce- 
dures may benefit today's cost-conscious managers 
in at least three ways. First, administering different 
interventions through a theoretically based yet ap- 
plication-driven model such as the O.B. Mod. 
model may provide a way to help overcome some 
of the design and process issues associated with the 
application of pay for performance and other incen- 
tive motivators, including social recognition and 
feedback. Second, showing whether the effects of 
different incentive motivators on work perfor- 
mance vary from each other and, if so, how much 
they vary, can help the managers of today's organi- 
zations not only to meet the challenge of improving 
performance, but also to reduce the cost or mini- 
mize the costs of doing so by choosing the most 
effective incentives for given circumstances. Fi- 
nally, this study showed that first-line supervisors 
can be quickly trained in the steps of behavioral 
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management, can effectively implement them 
using different incentive motivators, and can sub- 
sequently obtain positive performance results. In 
this era of renewed interest in gaining competitive 
advantage through people, management scholars 
are being challenged to make their theories and 
research findings more understandable, practical, 
and useful. This field study would seem to help 
meet this challenge. 
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